Compare AI models
| Specifications | ||
ParametersA rough measure of how big the model is. More parameters usually means more capable and more expensive to run, though it is a poor guide on its own — a smaller, newer model often beats a larger, older one. | — | 235B |
Context windowHow much text the model can hold in mind at once — your question, any documents you attach, the conversation so far, and its own reply. Go past it and the earliest part falls out of view. | — | 128k |
| API pricingUSD per 1M tokens · lower wins · base tier | ||
Input priceWhat you pay for everything you send the model — your question, plus any documents or earlier conversation you include with it. | $2.00 | $0.70 |
Output priceWhat you pay for the text the model writes back. It is normally the dearer half: producing an answer costs more than reading one. | $12.00 | $2.80 |
Cached input priceA reduced rate for text you send over and over. If every request starts with the same instructions or the same document, the provider keeps a copy ready and charges less to read it again. | $0.20 | — |
Cheapest inputLowest input rate across third-party providers, excluding the lab itself. The cheapest endpoint may run a quantised build or a shorter context — see "Available from" on the model page. | $1.00OpenAI | $0.0482StreamLake |
Cheapest outputLowest output rate across third-party providers, excluding the lab itself. May come from a different provider than the cheapest input. | $6.00OpenAI | $0.1931StreamLake |
| Benchmarks | ||
BullshitBench v2Nonsense detection — Given a confidently-worded but nonsensical prompt, does the AI spot that it makes no sense and push back — instead of playing along and inventing an answer? The score is how often it clearly called out the nonsense. Higher is better. | 54% | 6% |
Gray Swan IPI · k = 1Prompt injection robustness — Attackers hide malicious instructions inside content the AI reads — a web page, an email, a document — and try to hijack what it does. Gray Swan's indirect prompt injection benchmark measures how often such an attack succeeds when the attacker gets a single try. Lower is better. | 5.4% | — |
Gray Swan IPI · k = 10Prompt injection robustness — Attackers hide malicious instructions inside content the AI reads — a web page, an email, a document — and try to hijack what it does. This variant gives the attacker 10 tries and counts an attack as successful if any of them works. Lower is better. | 26% | — |
Gray Swan IPI · k = 15Prompt injection robustness — Attackers hide malicious instructions inside content the AI reads — a web page, an email, a document — and try to hijack what it does. This variant gives the attacker 15 tries and counts an attack as successful if any of them works. Lower is better. | 30.4% | — |
CursorBench 4.0Agentic coding — Cursor's own test of coding agents on ambiguous, multi-file tasks taken from real Cursor sessions — editing, refactoring, investigating a codebase, understanding what the user meant, managing jobs and following a design. Cursor runs each model at several reasoning efforts; each release here carries the score of its best listed effort. Scores aren't comparable with earlier CursorBench versions. Higher is better. | 41.3% | — |
Frontier-Bench v0.1Agentic computer work — A hard, ever-evolving set of real computer tasks — coding, system administration, data work, and more — that an AI agent has to complete on its own. Run by the Harbor / Laude Institute team as the successor to Terminal-Bench (v0.1 is the first release of the task set). The score is the share of tasks solved. Higher is better. | 20.8% | — |
Terminal-Bench 4.0Agentic terminal coding — Can the AI work in a command-line terminal — running commands and finishing technical setup tasks the way a developer would? Version 4.0 recalibrated how much time, CPU and memory each task gets, removed eight tasks and fixed nineteen, so fewer runs fail for reasons that have nothing to do with the model. Scores are not comparable with earlier versions. Higher is better. | 21.52% | — |
Terminal-Bench 2.1Agentic terminal coding — Can the AI work in a command-line terminal — running commands and finishing technical setup tasks the way a developer would? Higher is better. | 84.3% | — |
BrowseCompWeb browsing — Can the AI browse the web and track down hard-to-find answers? Higher is better. | 87.5% | — |
ARC-AGI-2Abstract reasoning — Puzzle-style tests of abstract reasoning and pattern-finding — the kind of thing people find easy but AIs often struggle with. Higher is better. | 83.9% | — |
threejsevalCommunity preference (Three.js) — Every model gets the same prompt — "the Eiffel Tower", "a glass fishbowl", "a robot arm picking toys into a box" — and builds a 3D scene in Three.js. Real people then see two scenes side by side, names hidden, and vote for the one they prefer. The votes become a chess-style Elo rating on threejseval.com, averaged across all the prompts. It measures whether the scene looks and moves right to a human eye, not whether the code passes a test. Higher is better. | 1436 | — |
| Overview | ||
| Company | OpenAI | Qwen |
| Release date | Jun 26 2026 | Apr 29 2025 |
| Access | Closed | Open Weight |
| Model details | View model | View model |
Other comparisons
GPT-5.6 TerravsClaude Haiku 5.5Qwen3vsClaude Haiku 5.5GPT-5.6 TerravsGemini 4 ArgonQwen3vsGemini 4 ArgonGPT-5.6 TerravsMuse Spark 1.3Qwen3vsMuse Spark 1.3GPT-5.6 TerravsGrok 4.7Qwen3vsGrok 4.7GPT-5.6 TerravsDeepSeek-V4.1-FlashQwen3vsDeepSeek-V4.1-FlashGPT-5.6 TerravsMistral Large 4Qwen3vsMistral Large 4Frequently asked questions
GPT-5.6 Terra leads Qwen3 on 1 of the 1 benchmark they both report (BullshitBench v2). Qwen3 is cheaper on both input and output: $0.70 vs $2.00 per million input tokens, and $2.80 vs $12.00 per million output tokens. Figures are base-tier rates. Qwen3 shipped 423 days before GPT-5.6 Terra, so benchmark comparisons should account for the intervening progress.
GPT-5.6 Terra is closed, while Qwen3 is open weight.
On BullshitBench v2, GPT-5.6 Terra leads at 54% vs Qwen3 at 6%.